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rate (an added-to or mark-up charge on the amount of the ad-
vance), or as a discount rate on the amount of the advance.16
The first of these methods, if used to establish the customer rate,
would result in a term structure similar to the 1935 structure. The
second would more closely approximate the term structure shown in
the years after 1935.
Other writers have commented on the existence of varied methods
of charge in instalment credit, but none have identified those used
predominantly in automobile financing.'7 E. R. A. Seligman com-
mented on the variety of systems of charge that existed during the
1920's, but the 1935 term structure of finance rates shown in Chart
2 provides the only empirical evidence to support the idea that a
predominance of charges were computed in a manner unrelated to
length of maturity in new-automobile financing. The 1936—38 term
structure resulted from the rate per annum method, noted above,
which was required by the Six Per Cent Plan method of computa-
tion.
As shown in Chart 2, a relatively flat term structure of finance
rates in 1936—38 contrasts sharply with the declining structure in
1935. The lengthening of maturities from 24 to 36 months between
1936—38 and 1954—55 did not sharply alter the term structure. A
tendency for rates to increase with length of maturity could be ob-
served for all companies, although not for the four large companies.
However, by 1958—59, mean rates for the four large companies rose
with longer maturities. Thus it can be concluded that important
shifts in the term structure of mean finance rates have occurred
since 1935 but that changes since 1936—38 have been moderately in
the direction of average rates which rise as contract maturities
lengthen.
NEW-AUTO FINANCE RATES AND COMMERCIAL
BORROWING RATES, 1924—62
With sample data discussed above as bench marks for further in-
vestigation of rate movement, Table 8 presents annual estimates of
16. Financial Problems of Instalment Selling (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1931), p.93.
17. E. R. A. Setigman, The Economics of Installment Selling (New York: Harper &
Bros., 1927), I, 288 if.; William Trufant Foster and H. LeBaron R. Foster, "Rate As-
pects of Instalment Legislation," Law and Contemporary Problems, April, 1935, pp.
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rates for 1924—41 and 1946_62.18Duringthis
the highest rate apparently occurred during the depression years of
1932 and 1933, about 50 per cent higher than in 1954—55. The low-
est finance rate shown is in 1951, only 3 per cent below the level in
1954—55. The average finance rate for 1924—35 was 15.33 per cent;
CHART 2
TERM STRUCTURE OF MEAN FINANCE RATES,
YEARS, SALES FINANCE COMPANY GROUP
Fourlarge companies, all regions








All soles finance group, 3 regions
Length of maturity (months)
Source:1935, 1936—38 FTC sample; 1954—55 FRS sample; and
sample.
18. The trend of new-auto finance rates shown in Table 8 and
ciably from Paul F. Smith's series showing changes in average
1958—59 NBER
Chart 3 differs appre-
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INDEX OF NEW-AUTO FINANCE RATE ESTIMATES, ANNUALLY,
1924-62: 4 LARGE SALES FINANCE COMPANY GROUP
*Sources for Table 8:
1924—41.—Ratesin1935 through 1938 were calculated directly from FTCsampleof four
large company credit contracts. An index of finance charges from one of the four companies
applicable toa new Chevrolet financed in Albany, New York, with down payment and
12-month maturity was taken from worksheets used in preparation of Chart VIII, p. 91, of
C.Haberler,Consumer InstalmentCredit and Economic Fluctuations (NBER, 1942), toextrapo-
late the average rate level in 1936—38 during 1924—34 and 1939—41. The Haberler index was
placed on an annual basis by computing a weighted average of the number of days at each index
level based on a 360-day year, The 1936—38 average rate (11.703 per cent) was 0.82215 of the
base period (1924—41100) index average. So, solving 11.7030.82215x, the 1924—41 aver-
age fortheperiod was 14.2346. and estimates of finance rates were computed by multiplying
this figure by. the Haberler index as adjusted for each year.
1946—55.—Ratesin1954 and 1955 were calculated directly from Federal Reserve sample
of credit contracts in "Financing New Car Purchases," cit. Anindex of finance charges paid
by purchasers per $100 of unpaid balance of a 12-month contract maturity written on a low-
priced popular model passenger car from a sample of sales finance companies was taken from
ConsumerInstalment Credit, Boardof Governors of the Federat Reserve System, Part I, Vol. 1,
p. 59, and used to extrapolate the 1954—55 average computed finance rate back to 1946. The
1954—55 average rate (11.31 cent) was equivalent to the Federal Reserve index average of
101 (1946 = 100) and rates in other years were computed by multiplying 11.31 per cent by
where xis any given value of the Federal Reserve index. -
1956—57.—Rateswerecalculated directly from a sample of credit contracts, representing
May and September in each year, supplied by one large sales finance company to the National
Bureau. The average difference between the single-company rate and the four-company group
rate in September, 1955, and May, 1958, was used to adjust the single company's average rates
in May and September, 1956 and 1957, to the estimated four-company group level.
1958—59.—Rateswerecalculated directly from February, May, September, and November
sample credit contracts supplied by three large sales finance companies and May and September
contracts from one large sates finance company in each year (NBER sample).
1960—62.—Rates were calculated from a distribution of add-on rates charged customers of
one large sates finance company, together with the estimated average maturity of contracts
purchased in February, May, August, and November in each year. A weighted average (add-on)
rate was computed from the distribution and used to compute the effective annual rate equiva-
lent in the following adaptation of the constant-ratio formula:
2(n)——
n+1
whereFisthe add-on rate, nisthe average maturity of the credit contracts, and iisthe effec-
tive annual finance rate. The resulting single-company rates were adjusted to the four-com-




























































































































10722 New-Automobile Finance Rates, 1924—62
for 1936—41 it was 11.67 per cent; and for 1946—62,11.72 percent.
In 1948 there was apparently a temporary rise; finance rates then
declined to the 1951 low. Since then, there has been a steady upward
trend in sales finance company rates to 12.46 per cent in 1960, and
a decline thereafter to the 1962 level of 12.15 per cent.
In order to determine whether finance rate movements are related
to general influences upon the cost of money, the annual series de-
veloped for new auto finance rates is compared with interest rates
on commercial loans from banks and long-term corporate bond
yields in Chart 3. The commercial loan interest-rate series reflects
all loan sizes between 1924 and 1941, whereas from 1939 to 1959
separate data are available on rates on loans within the $1—10,000
loan size class. The corporate bond yield series is for high-grade
corporate issues with thirty years' maturity. The two series were
chosen from a group of series measuring money rates and capital
yields because scatter diagrams suggested that these two were more
highly correlated with finance rates.1° Also the two series selected
represented sectors important to the sales finance industry as sources
of funds, and the bank rate series in the later period reflects rates
on relatively small loans.
According to Chart 3, there is an apparent correspondence in the
trend of commercial borrowing rates and new-auto rates over the
entire period 1924—59. The 1924—32 period was characterized by
a roughly stable level of rates, 1932—41 by a downward trend, and
1946—59 by a gently rising trend. Over the entire period the differ-
ential between new-auto finance rates and other interest rates seems
to have narrowed; automobile credit became cheaper relative to
other borrowing. A corollary to the narrowed differential is the fact
that the rates paid for borrowed funds by sales finance companies
represented a larger portion of the rates charged automobile credit
buyers.
The sharp changes in the level of new-automobile finance rates
were larger than corresponding changes in both of the commercial
borrowing rate series shown in Chart 3. Particularly apparent are
new and used automobile receivables held by ten large sales finance companies in "Con-
sumer Credit Costs at Four Major Types of Financial Institutions, 1949—59" (NBER,
in preparation). The series are not directly comparable because of differences in scope,
coverage, and weighting procedures resulting from Smith's alternate objective of show-
ing rate-cost relationships within an institutional framework in contrast to the measure-
ment and analysis of new-auto finance rates presented here. The differences between the
two series will be discussed in greater detail in the Smith manuscript.
19. Other series checked on scatter diagrams were commercial paper rates, call-loan

































































































































































































































































































































































924 New-Automobile Finance Rates, 1924—62
the sharp rises in rates in 1927 and 1932, which were either counter
to or greater than the movements in borrowing rates generally. In
both of these years there was a sharp rise in repossession rates on
new autos,2° suggesting that finance rates were adjusted upward to
cover the added burden of collection expense (Table 9).
As noted earlier, the sharp drop in new-auto rates shown between
1934 and 1936 began with the Six Per Cent Plan in the autumn of
1935. This plan brought the annual rate for the year 1935 as a whole
below the 1934 level. The rate cut at that time, however, became
effective much more speedily than indicated by the annual rate
series.
A combination of factors can be offered to explain this rate de-
cline. First, there was a decline in interest rates generally dating
from 1932 in the two commercial borrowing rate series shown in
Chart 3. Second, there was a sharp drop in repossession rates on
new cars, beginning in 1933 (Table 9) and continuing through
1936. Third, losses on automobile paper held by sales finance com-
panies had been kept down to 2 per cent or less of the total out-
standing (Table 9) during the 1929—32 period, and the record may
have encouraged reduction of finance rates. Furthermore, collision
insurance was required in 1934, lowering anticipated future losses
from damaged collateral security to the credit
It is noteworthy that there was no increase in average new-auto
finance rates in 1937 and 1938 despite the sharp rise in repossession
and loss rates in those years. By 1938, the repossession rate was
higher than in 1932, but the loss rate, on the other hand, was well
below the 1932 rate. The data of Table 9 suggest that the main-
tenance of loss ratios below 1 per cent of total automobile paper
outstanding, even in 1938, may have encouraged the large sales
financing agencies to continue the lower rates established in 1935.
Two of the five sample companies had loss ratios above 4 per cent
of outstanding auto paper in 1938, but their experience was counter-
balanced by the more favorable experience of the other three com-
panies.22
In the thirteen-year period following World War II, new-auto
20. The repossession rate is the ratio of the number of repossessed cars to the number
of cars financed during the year. The repossessions include cars financed in earlier years
as well as in the current year.
21. J. P. Winchester, Consumer instalment Loan Losses and Valuation Reserves
(Cambridge, Mass.: Bankers Publishing Co., 1955), p. 34.
22. ibid., p. 33. The relationship between repossession and loss rates is affected by the
dealer's ability to meet his liability as well as by the type of indorsement.TABLE 9
REPOSSESSIONAND Loss RATES ON SALES FINANCE
COMPANY AUTOMOBILE PAPER, 1925-55
(In Per Cent)
YEAR
AUTOMOBILE REPOSSESSION RATES AUTOMOBILE PAPER Loss RATE
New New and Used Volume Outstanding
NASCF* Winchesterf
1925 2.1 n.a. na. n.a.
1926 2.4 ri.a. n.a. n.a.
1927 2.9 ri.a. na. n.a.
1928 2.9 4.1 n.a. n.a.
1929 3.0 4,2 .62 1.13
1930 3.7 5.4 1.12 2.08
1931 4.5 8.5 .86 1.69
1932 5.7 .10.4 .83 1.63
1933 2.8 5.7 .36 .60
1934 2.9 .5.3 .38 .68
1935 2.7 7.3 .33 .37
1936 2.2 5.1 .27 .44
1937.... 4.1 9.4 .40 .60
1938.... 6.3 15.1 .69 .97
1939.... 2.7 7.5 .32 .48
1940.... n.a. n.a. .35 .50
1941... n.a. n.a. .33 .50
1946 .07 n.a. .11 .20 n.a.
1947 .32 n.a. .16 .28 n.a.
1948 .74 3.4 .19 .30 .62
1949 1.30 4.8 .34 .50 .71
1950 1.58 5.2 .15 .21 .24
1951 1.25 4.8 .22 .31 .39
1952 1.58 6.1 n.a. n.a. .59
1953 2.33 7.1 n.a. n.a.'.62
1954 5.52 9.3 n.a. n.a. .64
1955 4.71 6.8 n.a. n.a. .40
*Number of repossessionsduringyear in percent of the number of instalment contracts purchased during
year. Companies are those supplying data to the National Association ofSalesFinance Companies. Repossession
rate levels between 1925 and 1939 are not comparable to 1946—55 rates because of differences in the samples.
t New and used auto paper collection losses in per cent of volume and outstandings from live large com-
panies. 1929—1951 data from Winchester, Consumer InsiatmeniLoan Losses.
tNew auto repossession rates are based on one large company's experience, and new and used data are
rom Moore, Atkinson, and Klein, Consumer Instalment Credil, op. cit., Vol. 2, Part I, Table 29.
§ large companies from NB ER, Consumer Credit Quality Study.26 New-Automobile Finance Rates, 1924—62
finance rates moved upward with rising money rates generally, es-
pecially after 1951. The temporary rise in rates in 1948 was coinci-
dent with rises in commercial borrowing rates, but the increase in
new-auto finance rates was much larger. Available statistics on de-
linquency, repossessions, and loss rates suggest some upward move-
ment in these series, but from levels which were probably well below
those considered normal before World War II.
Perhaps the 1948 rise in auto finance rates came in expectation of
higher repossession and loss rates from the movement to easier
terms which followed the expiration of federal consumer credit con-
trol (Regulation W) on November 1, 1947. At that time consumer
credit regulation had been in existence six years. New-auto minimum
down payment had been per cent and the maximum maturity
15 months. In the period after regulation, with new automobiles still
in short supply, typical down payments remained at per cent,
but some contracts with down payments of 25 per cent were occa-
sionally allowed.23 The typical maturity moved from 15 to18
months, with occasional longer contracts up to 24 months.24 One
large sales finance company's repossession rate, shown in Table 9,
indicates a rising trend between 1947 and 1950. Quarterly data
during the same period for the same company suggest that the re-
possession rates rose fairly consistently. When Regulation W was
temporarily reimposed on September 1, 1948, required terms were
not as stringent as those required before the previous regulation
expired. With the 1949 recession, permissible terms were eased
twice and the temporary regulation expired on June 30, 1949. Dur-
ing the reimposition of regulation, repossession rates rose steadily
as a result of the adverse employment situation, despite the regu-
lation of credit terms.
The expiration of consumer credit regulation in 1947 after six
years of continuous existence may have played a part, together with
rising short-term money rates and expectation of increased reposses-
sion and loss rates, in the 1948 finance rate increase. As the second
column of Table 9 indicates, these expectations were realized. Yet
the extent to which losses were held down despite rising repossession
rates, as in 1938, may have been a favorable cost factor permitting
the later decline in finance rates after 1948. In any event, it is
evident that some combination of actual cost factors, expectations,
and the special factor of direct credit regulation combined to in-
23. "Consumer Credit Trends," Federal Reserve Bulletin, August, 1948, p. 902.
24. Ibid.New-Automobile Finance Rates, 1924—62 27
duce the temporary rise and subsequent reversal of new-auto finance
rates in the 1947—50 period.
The remainder of the period shown in Chart 3, from 1951 through
1959, shows new-auto finance rates moving upward to about the
same extent as the long-term corporate bond yield series, and some-
what more than the rise in small-sized, short-term business loan
rates. The change in the all-size business loan rate series, not shown
after 1941, exceeded the rise in new-auto finance rates. During this
period substantially heavier reliance upon long-term financing de-
veloped among the large sales finance companies, and it is likely
that rate policies were more closely related to changes in the yields
on long-term corporate securities, within the term structure of gen-
eral interest-rate movements, than was true during earlier years.
SHORT-RUN MOVEMENTS IN NEW-AUTO FINANCE RATES
AND RELATED SERIES, 1953—59
In Chart 4, unadjusted monthly and quarterly commercial bor-
rowing rates are compared with quarterly and semiannual new-auto
finance rates between 1953 and 1959. As noted earlier, the trend of
rates was upward, reflecting the generally tighter monetary con-
ditions that have existed, except during recession, since1951.
Chart 4 uses monthly commercial paper rates (dealer market) to
exemplify short-term rate movements, Aaa corporate bond yields
to portray long-term rate behavior, and the $1—10,000 loan size
commercial loan rates to typify the closest commercial loan size
counterpart to the consumer new-automobile finance rate series.
Since 1953, the changes in new-auto finance rates were somewhat
greater in percentage points than in either the small-size business loan
or corporate bond yield series. On the other hand, the commercial
paper rate series, reflecting the wide variation in short-term interest
rates characteristic of the period, showed even greater changes. The
movement of the new-auto finance rate series resembles the move-
ment of either the Aaa corporate bond yield or the short-term, small-
size business loan rate series. It does not have the wide swings
characteristic of open-market short-term rates. Its behavior could
be interpreted as that of an intermediate-term rate reacting to
changes in both the level and term structure of open-market rates
generally. Such an interpretation suggests that auto finance rates
move with all open-market rates, somewhat less than short-term
rates, and more than long-term rates.
The data in Chart 4 cover three National Bureau turning points:Rote or yield (percent)
13
CHART 4
NEw-AuTo FINANCE RATES COMPARED WITH COMMERCIAL
BORROWING RATES, 1953-59
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Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions. New-auto average finance rate data
for 1956 through 1959 are for contracts with standard maturities only. 1954—55 are quarterly
data, 4th quarter 1955 to February 1958 is an extrapolation derived from one large sales
finance company, and 1958—59 are data for February, May, September, and November.
Source: Bond yield (corporate Aaa) is from Survey olCurrent Business. Commercial paper
rate is computed from weekly data in Bank and Quotation Record (Commercial and
Financial Chronicle). Short-term business loan rate is for March, June, September, and
December from Federal Reserve Bulletins. New-auto finance rates are from the Federal Re-
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the August, 1954, trough, the July, 1957, peak, and the April, 1958,
trough. The new-auto finance rate series lagged the turning points
consistently. So did the small-size commercial bank loan rate and
the commercial paper rate, although the lags in the latter were
shorter than in the other two series. The turns in bond yields came
still earlier. In short, as one might expect, the two open-market rate
series moved more promptly at business-cycle turns than new-auto
finance rates. But the data are not sufficiently numerous to permit
generalization beyond this point.
CHART 5
NEw-AuTo AVERAGE FINANCE RATES COMPARED WITH AUTOMOBILE
CREDIT EXTENSIONS AND OUTSTANDINGS, 1953-59
Percent New Auto Average Finance Rates (4 regions)
13
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Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions.Arithmetic scale showing finance
ratesis used to highlight cyclical pattern and is not comparable with other series on log
scale. Rate data for 1956 through 1959 are for contracts with standard maturities only.
1954—55 are quarterly data. 4th quarter 1955 to February 1958 is an extrapolation derived
from one large sales finance company, and 1958—59are data for February, May, September,
and November.
Source: New-auto finance rates are from the Federal Reserve and National Bureau
samples. Instalment credit extensions and outstandings are from FederalReserve Bulletins.30 New-Automobile Finance Rates, 1924—62
The movements of new-automobile finance rates between 1953
and 1959 should also be viewed in relation to automobile credit ex-
tensions and outstandings. Chart 5 suggests that the movements
among all three series are similar in general direction, but with a
rough correspondence in timing. The turns in automobile credit ex-
tensions clearly precede those in the level both of outstandings and
of finance rates. The latter two series, on the other hand, seem to be
approximately coincident with each other, both lagging behind busi-
ness-cycle turns by 5 or 6 months, on the average (Table 10).
TABLE 10*
LEADSAND LAGS IN SELECTED CONSUMER AND COMMERCIAL BORROWING
SERIES AT THREE BUSINESS CYCLE TURNING POINTs, 1954-58
(Months)
LEAD(—), COINCIDENCE (0),




Trough, Peak, Trough, TURNING
August July April POINTS
1934 1937 1958
New-autofinancerate + 7 +7 +5 +6*
Commercialhank ($1—10,000) loan rate +10 +2 +5 +5*
Commercial paper rate, 4—6 months, dealer
market +4 +3 +3 +3*
Corporate bond yield, Aaa —4 +2 +2 0
Auto paper outstanding + 5 +3 +7 +5
AutoPaPer extended —7 +3t —1
* Source:See source notes for Charts 4 and 5.
tSeptember,1955, peak (—22) regarded as a separate cycle independent of 1957 turning point.
These observations support the inference that the effects of re-
strictive credit policy are transmitted to new-automobile credit buy-
ers with some delay. Further, the coincidence in timing of changes
in finance rates with those in outstanding credit (instead of with
credit extended) suggests that the effects of more costly funds to
sales finance companies must become appreciable in relation to the
amount of paper held before rate increases occur.
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF MAJOR FINDINGS
New-auto finance rates in the United States averaged 10.86 per
cent during 1954 and 1955. The rates on individual credit contracts
varied widely. Rates were found to vary by type of lender, region,
and state legal-rate ceiling categories. Sales finance company rates
in 1954—55 averaged 11.37 per cent, indirectly financed commercialNew-Automobile Finance Rates, 1924—62 31
bank rates 10.84 per cent, and directly financed bank rates 9.48 per
cent per annum. The northeast and north-central regions were low-
rate regions, and the South and West showed higher average rates.
States with the lowest legal ceilings on rates had lower average rates
(10.19 per cent) than the remaining groups (10.89—11.61 per cent),
but all the average rates were well below permissible legal ceilings.
The remainder of the investigation of finance rates concentrated
upon sales finance company data, because of the limited availability
of commercial bank figures. A newly constructed series, based on
data from large sales finance companies, indicated that new-auto-
mobile finance rates varied markedly between 1924 and 1959 from
a high of 16.94 per cent in 1932 to a low of 10.98 per cent in 1951.
Average finance rates in the 1920's varied around 15 per cent, ris-
ing abruptly to the 1932 high in that year. The largest decline in
finance rates occurred in November, 1935, when General Motors
Acceptance Corporation introduced its "Six Per Cent Plan," which
appears to have reduced finance rates about one-fifth below the pre-
ceding level of almost 15 per cent. Despite the fact that the Six Per
Cent Plan's advertising was later prohibited, rates remained at the
lower level (11.63 per cent) until World War II and rose tempo-
rarily in 1948 before the 1951 low. After 1951, new-auto finance
rates rose gradually to the 1960 level of 12.46 per cent per annum
before declining to 12.15 per cent in 1962.
The magnitude and extent of these rate movements disprove the
widely held view that automobile finance rates are stable. The range
of variation over time is large and is similar in direction to changes
in money costs (interest rates). Viewed annually, movement of new-
automobile finance rates has been closely related to money costs,
and in two instances (1929 to 1936 and 1948 to 1950) showed rate
movements larger than those observed in commercial borrowing
rates. In both instances, special cost factors involving collection
expense and losses, seem to explain these movements beyond those
indicated by changes in money costs generally.
There are indications that new-auto finance rate movements lag
behind movements in open-market short- and long-term money
rates. Although rate data on a quarterly or semiannual basis were
sufficiently sparse to limit observations to three business cycle turn-
ing points (1954, 1957, and 1958), there was a consistent lag o
new-auto finance rates behind each turning point in business, as well
as behind turning points in commercial paper rates and corporate
bond yields. New-auto finance rates moved about as promptly as32 New-Automobile Finance Rates, 1924—62
bank rates on small-size loans to business. New-auto finance rates
lagged auto credit extensions, but their timing was similar to that
of automobile credit outstanding.
The over-all evidence suggests that factors affecting money costs
do govern the movement of new-auto finance rates, but with an
appreciable lag behind business cycle turning points and open-
market borrowing rates. The implications of this evidence, admit-
tedly fragmentary, for central bank credit policy refute previous
hypotheses that changes in credit policy do not reach consumer
credit because of the insensitivity of finance rates. The credit policy
issue posed by these data is narrowed to questions of the length of
time for monetary policy measures to be transmitted and the degree
to which inelasticity of demand makes the new-automobile credit
sector unresponsive to changes in finance rates.
Analysis of new-automobile finance rate changes reveals that the
cost of this financing has become loWer relative to commercial bor-
rowing costs and money rates over the years since 1924. That is to
say, the differential between new-auto finance rates and both short-
and long-term interest rates has become narrower. One of the rea-
Sons is the decline of losses in percentage of credit outstanding
among the large sales finance companies. In the mid-1930's, after
collision insurance was required of borrowers, losses in percentage
of new-auto credit outstanding dropped by one-third to one-half of
1929—32 levels and did not rise appreciably despite adverse repos-
session experience in 1938, 1949, and 1954. Comparable data were
not available to evaluate repossession rates and losses during the
1958 recession.25
There are other reasons why auto credit costs have declined in
the long run. Rising levels of income and asset accumulation have
made auto credit purchasers better risks. Larger loan sizes and
longer maturities have lessened the share of acquisition and service
costs in relation to the average amount of automobile credit out-
standing. Lenders have standardized procedures and acquired ex-
perience in evaluating the risks inherent in the purchase of credit
contracts from dealers. In addition, buying rates for new-auto paper
have dropped under pressures engendered by increased competition
from banks for the purchase of dealer paper and by the low direct-
lending rates of banks and credit unions.
25.Analysisof the over-all losses experienced by a sample of ten large sales finance
companies that depended heavily upon auto financing reveal that the 1958 losses, at 1.8
per cent of credit outstanding, were the highest of the 1949—59 period (see Paul
Smith, Consumer Credit Costs).New-Automobile Finance Rates, 1924—62 33
The increase in new-auto finance rates between 1936—38 and 1959
would presumably have been negligible if the automobile dealers'
share of the finance rate had not risen. The net rates to the large
sales finance companies in 1958 and 1959 did not differ appreciably
from the relatively low 1936—38 average level. As it is, the bulk of
the increase in rates charged consumers between the two bench-
mark periods appears to have been attributable to a rising dealer
share of the finance rate. But some variation in the division of the
finance rate between dealers and credit agencies may have occurred
inthe intervening period. Moreover, the entire question con-
cerning short-term changes in these finance rate components re-
mains unsettled. Dealer reserve payments are reported to have
originated in 1924, but their magnitude before 1935 remains un-
reported 26
Importantshifts have occurred in the term (maturity) structure
of finance rates during the period under review. The major change
came between 1935 and 1936. Prior to that time, finance rates on
new automobile credit had tended to decline with length and ma-
turity, since charges were computed predominantly on the basis of
a flat percentage of the amount borrowed. By 1936—38 the per
annum method of computing charges had apparently replaced the
flat charge, and average rates were approximately the same at all
maturities. In 1954—55 a tendency for rates to increase with length
of maturity could be observed for all sales finance companies, al-
though average rates paid by consumers whose obligations were held
by the four large companies showed virtually no change with ma-
turity. By 1958—59, the four large companies' average rates were
somewhat higher on longer-term contracts than on shorter contracts.
As a result of these shifts, the changes in rates on credit contracts
of a given maturity may be said to differ from those in any average
of finance rates for all maturities. After 1935 these differences were
moderate.
26. Consi.inzer Instalment Credit, Part I, Vol. I, p.27.